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THE RISE AND FALL OF THE CENTRE-RIGHT COALITION
GOVERNMENT IN PORTUGAL (2002-2005)
This article assesses the impact of the centre-right coalition government on
Portuguese economy, society and politics. It starts with an analysis of the coalition
formation process and places it in the context of previous coalition governments
in Portugal. The austerity measures of the coalition government are then dis-
cussed at length. Moreover, government policies are placed within the context
of the emerging regime of monetary policy and fiscal discipline imposed by the
European integration process.
The austerity measures of the government were quite unpopular, allowing the
opposition parties on the left to make electoral gains in the two mid-term elections
to the European Parliament and to the regional assemblies of Madeira and the
Azores. The disorganised image of the Santana Lopes government led to early
elections being called by President Jorge Sampaio. On 20 February 2005, the
Socialist Party under popular leader José Socrates won the legislative elections
with an absolute majority.
Essor et chute du gouvernement de coalition de 
centre-droit au Portugal (2002-2005)
Quelle a été l’influence de la coalition de centre-droit sur l’économie, la société
et la politique portugaises ? L’analyse du processus de formation de cette coalition
est replacée dans l’histoire des autres gouvernements de coalition qu’a connus le
Portugal. Elle est suivie d’une étude approfondie des mesures d’austérité appliquées
prises par ce gouvernement, dans le contexte de la politique monétaire et fiscale
du processus d’intégration européenne.
Les mesures d’austérité du gouvernement furent peu populaires et de ce fait
les partis d’opposition de gauche furent capables d’engranger des gains électoraux
tant aux élections pour le Parlement européen que pour les assemblées régionales
de Madère et des Açores. L’image de désorganisation donnée par le gouvernement
de Santana Lopes a poussé le président Jorge Sampaio à provoquer des élections
législatives anticipées. Le 20 février 2005, le parti socialiste sous la direction de
son populaire leader José Socrates, a alors gagné les élections, à la majorité absolue.
A ascensão e a queda do governo de coligação do 
centro-direita em Portugal (2002-2005)
Este artigo avalia a influência da coligação da centro-direita sobre a economia,
a sociedade e a política portuguesa. A análise do processo da formação de coli-
gação é contextualizada na história dos governos de coligação que se sucederam
em Portugal. Esta análise é seguida de um estudo profundo das medidas de aus-
teridade implementadas e tomadas por este governo no contexto da política 
monetária e fiscal imposta pelo processo de integração europeia.
As medidas de austeridade do governo foram mal aceites, por isso os partidos
da oposição da esquerda puderam obter ganhos eleitorais nas duas eleições para
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o Parlamento Europeu e para as assembleias regionais da Madeira e dos Açores.
A imagem de desorganização dada pelo governo de Santana Lopes levou o
Presidente Jorge Sampaio a decidir eleições legislativas antecipadas. A 20 de
Fevereiro de 2005 o partido socialista, sob a direcção do popular líder José
Sócrates, alcançou a maioria absoluta nas eleições legislativas.
After 1998, Portugal became one of the twelve Member States taking part inthe third phase of Economic and Monetary Union. As a member it was and
is obliged to stick to the criteria of the growth and stability pact. Among these
criteria is containing the budget deficit below 3 percent of gross domestic product
(GDP). Although until 1999, the Portuguese government was able to keep to the
growth and stability pact convergence criteria, the deteriorating economic situa-
tion, the overall increase in social expenditure and, last but not least, the lack of
reforms in the public administration led to a budget deficit of 4.4 percent of GDP.
The Portuguese population has the worst qualification structure in the European
Union and there is a need for long-term investment in education and vocational
training to change this situation1. In terms of global recession, the open Portuguese
economy is more vulnerable to asymmetrical shocks than other stronger economies
in the European Union. Fast rises in unemployment lead to a considerable reduc-
tion in budget revenues and an increase in expenditure. Moreover, Portugal is
one of the countries with the largest informal economy in the European Union,
along with Spain, Italy and Greece. In times of crisis, the informal economic sec-
tor comprising mainly capital-poor small firms tends to grow, leading to increased
tax evasion. There is also a tendency to introduce new indirect taxes over direct
taxes to close the gap between income and expenditure. This is what happened
in the late phase of the Antonio Guterres government which was forced to turn
to so-called amended budget items to close the gap between income and expen-
diture. In 2000 and 2001, being one seat short of an absolute majority, it had to
rely on the support of a rebel Member of Parliament from the Social Democratic
Centre-People’s Party (CDS-PP, Centro Democrático Social-Partido Popular). In exchange,
the government allegedly promised to provide financial support for a cheese-
processing factory in its constituency of Ponte de Lima2. 
The centre-right coalition government, consisting of the social democratic party
(PSD, Partido Social-democrata) and the CDS-PP was a reaction to a deteriorating
budget situation, that led to further divergence from the criteria of the Economic
Monetary Union set out at Maastricht and confirmed in the growth and stability
pact. The recent centre-right coalition government in Portugal is an excellent
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1 C   E C, Council Recommendation on the Implementation of
Member States’ Employment Policies, Brussels, 12th of September 2001, COM-2001/512 final: 17;
E C, Social Situation in the European Union 2002, Luxembourg, Office of the
Official Publications of the European Union, 2002: 89 and 125.
2 J.M. M, “Portugal”, in “European Data Yearbook 2000”, special issue of European
Journal of Political Research, XXXVIII (3-4), December 2001: 396-401, particularly p. 400;
J.M. M, “Portugal”, in “European Data Yearbook 2001”, special issue of European Journal
of Political Research, XL (7-8), December 2002.
3 On the portuguese economy see D. C, The Portuguese Economy. A Case of Europeanization,
London, Routledge, 1999.
4 M. C, “Economic and Monetary Union”, in N. Nugent (ed.), European Union Enlargement,
Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2004: 184-198, particularly pp. 194-195.
example of how difficult it is to implement austerity measures in a country with
a weak economy. In spite of thirty years of democracy and twenty years of
European integration, Portugal is still characterised by labour-intensive industries,
with low investment in research and development and an inadequate education
system for the labour market3.
Portugal was the first country to have to deal with the excessive budget deficit
procedure of the European Commission. After 2002, other countries including
Germany, France, Italy and Greece were either on the brink or were also sub-
ject to the same procedure. Germany and France tried to change the rules of the
game in 2003, but a decision by the European Court of Justice upheld the posi-
tion of the European Commission. In spite of that, all the Member States agreed
to ease the excessive budget procedure in periods of crisis4.
In this article, our aim is to study this centre-right coalition government from
2002 until its downfall in 2005. One of the main reasons for its downfall was that
its austerity programme became more and more unpopular over time. Instead, a
growing number of people were switching their support for the opposition left-
wing parties. The elections of 18 February 2005 confirmed this trend. 
The article begins by discussing the aspect of coalition government in Portugal,
going on to apply it to the centre-right coalition government. Afterwards, the
difficulties of the government in presenting the agenda are explored. The subsequent
section analyses the European elections of 12 June 2004, before we turn to the
handover of power between Barroso and Santana Lopes. The last section deals
with the elections of 18 February 2005. The article will end with some conclusions.
The Elections of 17 March 2002: an Unconvincing Victory for the
Right-Centre Parties
The catastrophic results in the local elections of 16 December 2001, led to the
sudden resignation of Prime Minister António Guterres and his socialist govern-
ment. President Jorge Sampaio decided to call early elections. Guterres’ sudden
resignation happened in a period of recession and growing budgetary deficits. At
this point in time it was assumed that the budget deficit was above the 3 percent
of gross domestic product (GDP) prescribed by the criteria of Economic and
Monetary Union. The centre-right parties, in particular the PSD under José Manuel
Barroso, conducted an opposition strategy built around the topic of Portugal diverg-
ing increasingly from the European Union mainstream. The resignation of Guterres
could be regarded as a major victory for the PSD. The position of the PSD was
supported by the eurosceptic conservative CDS-PP which also regarded the man-
agement of the economy by the Socialist Party as deteriorating considerably. The
CDS-PP was led by the young, rather charismatic former journalist Paulo Portas.
Guterres also faced opposition from some quarters inside the party, which felt
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5 C. J, “As mesmas clivagens de sempre? Velhas clivagens e novos valores no compor-
tamento eleitoral portugues”, in A. Freire, M. Costa Lobo, P. Magalhães (eds), Portugal a Votos.
As eleições legislativas de 2002, Lisbon, Instituto de ciencias sociais, 2004: 87-124, particularly pp.
95-96; the electorate marais was used for the first time by E. D, D. L & P. W
(Les familles politiques aujourd’hui en France, Paris, Éditions de Minuit, 1966) to characterise the apo-
litical centrist electorate of the late sixties in France.
6 This is one of the popular self-characterizations of the party according to M. F, “The
Right in Portugal: the PSD and the CDS/PP”, in T.C. Bruneau (ed.), Political Parties and Democracy
in Portugal. Organizations, Elections, and Public Opinion, Boulder (Co), Westview Press, 1997: 77-111,
particularly p. 80.
7 The best studies on the PSD are M. F, PPD/PSD e a consolidação do regime democrático,
Lisbon, Editorial Notícias, 1998, and the unpublished PhD dissertation M.J. S, Elites, Fações,
e Conflito Intra-Partidário. O PPD/PSD e o Processo Político Português de 1974 a 1985, Évora, University
of Évora, 1989.
that he was no longer up to the job. The Socialist Party elected new leader
Eduardo Ferro Rodrigues, who had been a member of the Guterres government.
In the Communist Party (PCP, Partido Comunista Portugues), the lack of reform and
acceptance of opposition groups undermined its electoral chances. The perception
that it remained a fossilized, autocratic party characterized by a lack of renewal
was the main reason for its continuing internal crisis. Party leader Carlos Carvalhas
lacked charisma and was too dependent on eminence grise Álvaro Cunhal.
The campaign for the 17 March elections was regarded as one of the most
polarised since the founding elections of 25 April 1975. Nevertheless, both main
parties, the PS and PSD, avoided being specific about the policies they wanted
to implement to sort out the growing budget deficit. The PS acknowledged the
importance of tackling the deficit, but tended to refer to the social dimension of
convergence. The PSD stressed the need to re-converge towards the European
mainstream, but remained quite vague about the policies to achieve it. The main
objective for both parties was to attract the highest number of votes through catch-
all strategies, as the PS and PSD share a large number of voters in the centre.
These voters belong to the new middle-classes and are value-oriented rather than
class-oriented. Carlos Jalali calls it an “electorate marais”, which is apolitical and
more electoral-market oriented5.
In spite of the deteriorating economic situation, the victory of the PSD was
quite unconvincing. The PS under the leadership of Ferro Rodrigues was able to
achieve a respectable 37 percent and remain only 3 percentage points behind the
PSD. One of the main reasons for this poor result for the PSD may have been
the lack of charisma of leader José Manuel Durão Barroso who had faced oppo-
sition inside the party since he was elected by an extraordinary party conference
in the spring 1999. From the outset, this “most Portuguese party”6 has been char-
acterised by in-fighting and dominated by regional political barons, which have
shaped the direction of the party7. Barroso always had to deal with the factions
existing inside the party. 
The main loser of the elections was the Communist Party which lost more than
100,000 votes in comparison to the legislative elections of 1999. In contrast, the
Block of the Left (BE, Bloco da Esquerda), an electoral coalition consisting of the
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Trotskyite Revolutionary Socialist Party (PSR, Partido Socialista Revolucionário), the
Maoist Democratic People’s Union (UDP, União Democrática Popular) and the post-
modern Politics XXI (Política XXI ) was able to increase its 1999 result to 2.74
percent and 3 seats. This shows the pressure on the Communist Party to reform
itself, to become more attractive to the younger leftwing electorate which has
turned to the BE.
The CDS-PP was able to consolidate its result from the previous elections, in
spite of the catastrophic electoral results of December 2001. Arithmetically, the
two centre-right parties had enough support in parliament to establish a coalition.
Soon after the elections the PSD looked into the possibility of allying itself with
this small conservative party.
Tabl. I. – R   th M  L E
Parties 2002 1999-2002
Percentage Number +/- Percentage
PSD 40.21 105 +7.89
PS 37.79 96 - 6.21
CDS-PP 8.7 14 +0.32
PCP-The Greens 6.94 12 - 2.08
BE 2.74 3 +0.28
Source: Commissão Nacional de Eleições, <http://www.cne.pt>, accessed on 28th Sept. 2005.
The formation of a centre-right coalition is not something new in Portuguese pol-
itics. Indeed, between 1979 and 1983, there was a pre-electoral coalition called
the Democratic Alliance (AD, Aliança Democrática) which included the PSD, the
CDS and the tiny People’s Monarchic Party (Partido Popular Monárquico-PPM ). One
of the main aims of the AD was to change the highly revolutionary constitution
towards liberal-democratic principles. Nevertheless, the coalition government collapsed
due to infighting between party factions, the lack of charisma of Prime Minister
Francisco Pinto Balsemão and his inability to control dissent inside the party8.
This idea of a centre-right coalition was re-activated by the predecessor of José
Manuel Durão Barroso, Marcelo Rebelo Sousa, who was leader of the party
between 1997 and 1999. Actually, his strategy of developing a pre-electoral coali-
tion with the CDS-PP called the Democratic Alternative (AD, Alternativa Democrática)
emerged after the local elections of 1997. Rebelo Sousa began to change his mind,
however, when there was a change of leader in the CDS-PP, with Manuel Monteiro
handing over to Paulo Portas. Moreover, the party was not very enthusiastic about
this strategy, due to the fact that opinion polls tended to suggest that such a pre-
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8 For an account of the AD government under Francisco Pinto Balsemão see J. M,
“Portugal: the Rationale of Democratic Regime Building”, in W.C. Muller & K. Strom (eds.),
Coalition Governments in Western Europe, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000: 539-558, particu-
larly pp. 538-539.
9 1 government PS-CDS (1978), 3 gov. AD [PSD+CDS+PPM] (1979-1983), 1 gov. PS-PSD
(1983-1985). For more detailed information see M, op. cit.
10 Majoritarian means naturally a polarized two-party system and refers to the typology of
Arend Lijphardt of consensus based coalition government and majoritarian polarized coalition
government, characteristics of consensus democracies and Westminster model democracies respec-
tively. See A. L, Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Performance in Thirty – Six
Countries, New Haven, Yale University Press 1999: 90-115.
11 P.C. M, “Elections, Parties and Policy-Making Institutions”, in A. Costa Pinto (ed.),
Contemporary Portugal. Politics, Society and Culture, New York, Columbia University Press, 2003: 183-
202, particularly pp. 188-194.
12 Full text from O Público, 29th March 2002 http://www.dossiers.publico.pt accessed on 3rd
of January 2006.
electoral strategy would lead to just a slight improvement in the electoral position
of both parties. Last but not least, Durão Barroso led the opposition against such
a strategy throughout 1999. The resignation of Rebelo Sousa and his replacement
by Durão Barroso at the party conference of Coimbra in 1999 also represented
a shift in party strategy.
Summing up, the elections of 17 March 2002 pointed towards a coalition gov-
ernment between PSD and CDS-PP, in spite of the fact that Barroso’s original
hope was to achieve a strong absolute majority which would allow his own party
to take power. A coalition government between the two main parties, PS and
PSD, was not possible, due to the ongoing polarization between the two camps
since 1985. The PSD would also never ally itself with the Communists nor with
the new leftwing party. 
Setting up the Coalition-Government: the Quest for Convergence 
with Europe
The coalition between the PSD and CDS-PP was a minimal winning coalition
and from the outset ideologically quite convergent on many issues.
Portugal is one of the countries were coalition governments are quite seldom.
Between 1976 and 2002, there were five very short-lived coalition governments9.
They were all characterised by instability and led to early elections. This record
clearly shows the difficulty of establishing a coalition culture in Portugal. The pre-
ferred outcome is a clear majority for one party, either the PS or PSD. Between
1987 and 2001, such majorities existed. The PSD under Anibal Cavaco Silva was
able to gain two absolute majorities in 1987 and 1991 giving stability to the polit-
ical system, while the PS under Antonio Guterres came close to absolute majori-
ties in 1995 and 1999. There is a general trend towards a majoritarian10 two-party
system, in which smaller parties are declining11.
Coalition government is regarded as a last resort in the Portuguese political
system. The negotiations for a coalition started shortly after the elections and were
finalised within a month. The coalition’s framework agreement was announced
on 28th March and showed a strong convergence of objectives between the two
main parties12. In spite of policy differences in such areas as immigration, justice
and defence, both programmes were quite compatible, so that it was not difficult
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to find common ground13. The government programme included reform of the
public administration which was linked to reducing public spending. Measures to
revitalise the ailing Portuguese economy were given priority in the overall strat-
egy of the centre-right coalition. Overall, the programme was designed to improve
the competitiveness of the Portuguese economy. At the centre of the strategy lay
the issue of tackling the public finances14. In terms of ministerial positions, the
junior partner CDS-PP got the defence, justice and social security and labour
portfolios. Paulo Portas became the Defence Minister and Vice Prime Minister.
Barroso was very keen to keep the cabinet to the minimum number of ministers.
It therefore consisted of 17 members, of whom the vast majority belonged to the
senior partner, 3 to the junior partner and 1 was independent. Barroso included
many members of the former Cavaco Silva government. A central figure of the
overall cabinet was the so-called “Iron Lady” Manuela Ferreira Leite, who was
a super-minister in charge of finances and the reform of public administration.
She had previous experience in the Cavaco Silva governments between 1985 and
1995. Her main task was to reduce public spending considerably, including cut-
ting bureaucratic waste, and reducing superfluous personnel in public administra-
tion and superfluous governmental agencies. She was given drastic powers to
contain public spending, including powers over local authorities. According to first
estimates made by the department of Ferreira Leite, Portugal had a deficit of 3.8
percent of GDP, well above the prescribed 3 percent of the EMU criteria. In the
summer, the European Commission would revise the estimate to 4.4 percent. This
meant that the first year of government was geared to finding ways of cutting
public spending in a short term perspective15.
The Performance of the Coalition Government
The coalition government had major difficulties in gaining the confidence of the
population, due to their poor communication skills16. Indeed, the message that the
coalition government was giving to the outside world was that Portugal was in a
catastrophic economic situation and diverging from the rest of the European Union.
Although the data did point to this situation, the coalition government continued
to blame the previous government for the bad economic situation. The negative
discourse of the government had a major impact on the economic market and
foreign direct investment. This poor management of public relations on behalf of
the country was one of the major reasons for the difficulties restoring credibility
and confidence in government measures. When the government realised that they
were not undermining the previous government nor the opposition, but actually
their own prospects of success, the discourse changed towards a more optimistic
message. This led Prime Minister Durão Barroso to announce a package of €355
      -   45
13 Expresso, 23rd March, 2002.
14 A  R, Programa do XV Governo (Lisbon 2002): 8.
15 Expresso, Economia, 29th June 2002: 3-5; O Público, 12th July 2002: 25.
16 The concept of communicative discourse is taken from Vivien S, The Futures of
European Capitalism, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003: 240.
17 Diário de Notícias, 7th July 2002: 6.
18 Expresso, 5th July 2002: 5.
19 M.L. C, “2002 Annual Review for Portugal”, in European Industrial Relations
Observatory online, http://www.eiro.eurofound.eu.int>, accessed on 10th of September 2004.
20 O Público, 12th July 2002: 2; 13th July 2002: 3.
million of programmes, most of them financed through the EU structural funds,
which would lead to investment in infrastructures and to the relaunching of the
ailing Portuguese economy17.
Containing the Budget Deficit
In spite of this, the government remained quite unpopular, trailing in the opin-
ion polls behind the main opposition party, the PS, during the summer. Barroso
continued to be less popular than Ferro Rodrigues, the leader of the Socialist
Party18. The drastic policies were also accompanied by a huge legislative pro-
gramme which the coalition government wanted to push through parliament with-
out proper consultation of the opposition parties. This further undermined cooperation
between the main parties. In the autumn, the centre-right coalition government
had to deal with growing discontent among public civil servants who feared for
their future prospects in view of the intended reforms of public administration by
the government. The increase in the number of strikes and industrial relations
conflict further undermined the centre-right coalition government. The main
Communist-dominated trade union confederation the General Confederation of
Portuguese Workers (CGTP-In, Confederação Geral dos Trabalhadores Portugueses-
Intersindical ) organised a highly successful general strike against the government on
10 December 200219.
The crisis was exacerbated when a trial related to the University Moderna, a
private higher education institution, revealed that Vice Prime Minister Paulo Portas,
who had been director of the university’s opinion polls centre, allegedly used funds
from the university for his party the CDS-PP. Paulo Portas was only a witness at
the trial, but this alleged undercover transfer of resources led to a negative reac-
tion among public opinion.
Prime Minister Barroso had also to deal with the fact that his party continued
to be highly divided with strong opposition against the new centre-right coalition
government, including from his predecessor Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa. The 24th
PSD party conference in early July 2002 was designed to rally the party around
the rebirth of the party as a government party. Optimistically, he conveyed the
image that his government would last for a decade and lead to major reforms
similar to what Anibal Cavaco Silva had achieved between 1985 and 1995. The
overall atmosphere of the party was sober, not triumphant20.
During 2003, several important measures were introduced that had a strong
impact on the economy. The government froze the salaries of public civil servants
earning more than €1,000 per month. This measure affected about two thirds of
the 700,000 civil servants. The salaries of civil servants earning below this figure
would be adjusted in line with inflation. The government also introduced indirect
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taxes and started selling off public enterprises. Ferreira Leite controlled local author-
ity expenditure tightly and banned them from borrowing. Last, but not least, the
ailing National Health Service had to endure tight austerity measures21. The gov-
ernment also increased student fees in the public university sector to €852, lead-
ing to major protests by students.
Quite central to Barroso’s government programme was public administration
reform. The lack of such reform had led to growth in personnel costs in the pub-
lic administration. In 2003, Portugal spent 15 percent of GDP on personnel costs,
above the EU-15 average of 11 percent. Only Denmark (17.7 percent) and Sweden
(16.6 percent) are above this average, with considerably higher GDP22.
He asked former Minister of Foreign Affairs and former Commissioner of the
European Commission João de Deus Pinheiro to chair a commission to assess
how the Portuguese public service could be modernised. Barroso’s overall long-
term plan was to slim down public administration and move towards a post-mod-
ern reflexive public administration which would create more public-private
partnerships and become more transparent and accountable. He wanted to pro-
mote a public management model based on the principles of governance. Some
EU structural funds were redirected to help finance these reforms, in particular
to improve the qualifications and professionalisation of civil servants23.
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J.A. P, “Non-Decision Making and Inertia”, Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, XXX
(1-2), February-April 2005: 212-230.
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The austerity measures had a negative impact on the Portuguese economy. At
the end of 2003, Portugal registered negative growth for the first time since the
transition to democracy. This had a major impact on unemployment figures which
were rising quite fast. The number of firms that had to close their doors due to
the recession increased dramatically at the beginning of 2004. In spite of huge
efforts, Ferreira Leite predicted that the budget deficit would remain just slightly
below the EMU criteria threshold by 2.9 percent of GDP. In this sense, the
Portuguese government had little room for manoeuvre. Indeed, apart from the
rising personnel costs in public administration, the main reason for the budget
deficit was the considerable increase in social expenditure on education, health
and social security in the second half of the 1990s. Economic growth until 2001
allowed for the improvement of social transfers of the Portuguese welfare state,
which developed quite late and still provided the population with the lowest social
transfers in absolute numbers, in spite of the fact that in relative terms, it repre-
sented a considerable additional burden for the budget. It is expected that social
security, particularly expenditure on pensions, will remain a major problem for
the Portuguese government24.
Tabl. II. – G   P G D P (GDP) -
Growth of GDP 2002 2003 2004
World 3 4 5.1
Eurozone 0.9 0.5 1.8
Portugal 0.4 -1.1 1.1
Source: B  P, Relatório annual 2004, Lisbon, Banco de Portugal 2005: 15.
The government set big hopes on the forthcoming Football European champion-
ships to achieve a revival of the economy. Indeed, at the end of the year the
figures of the economy were becoming more promising. This became evident when
they started the campaign for the European Parliament elections of 13 June 2004.
These elections were regarded as the first test for the right-centre coalition gov-
ernment.
Reforming the Labour Market
Since the adoption of the Lisbon strategy for employment and competitiveness in
the European economy by 2010, Portugal has been committed, like other mem-
bers of the European Union, to introducing measures to achieve a more com-
petitive labour market. It must be acknowledged that, in comparative terms, the
Portuguese working population has a high level of employability which fits in more
or less with the targets set out in the Lisbon strategy. The main problem is that
most of this employment is very precarious, temporary and with a low level of
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social protection. Indeed, one fifth of the Portuguese working population has fixed-
term contracts, the highest level in the European Union, surpassed only by Spain
with one third of its population in such a situation. Most of these jobs are pre-
carious and paid low wages. Like in Spain, it is impossible to make long term
plans25. The Portuguese economy is based on low wages, so families are depen-
dent on the income of all their members. Although there is protective social leg-
islation, child labour is still a reality in Portugal which naturally leads to dropping
out of school early to help the collective family income26. In cases of crises such
as in 1978-79 and 1983-84, firms may just not pay out salaries, and many employ-
ees have to deal with the phenomenon of wages being several months in arrears.
This includes even football teams of the Portuguese Superliga like Vitória de
Setúbal presently.
The centre-right coalition government was very keen to reform the labour mar-
ket. It engaged in a dialogue with the employers’ organisations, particularly the
Confederation of Portuguese Industry (CIP-Confederação da Industria Portuguesa) and
the main trade union confederations the CGTP-In and the General Workers’
Union (UGT, União Geral dos Trabalhadores). The Portuguese system of intermedia-
tion is dominated by the Economic and Social Council (CES, Conselho Economico
e Social ) institutionalised in 1992. The most relevant bargaining body within the
CES is the Council for Social Consultation (CPCS-Conselho Portugues de Concertação
Social ) which was founded in 1983 by a previous coalition government of the two
main parties PS and PSD. The general pattern is that employers’ organisations
and the UGT tend to search for a compromise, while the CGTP-In has a record
of opposition to labour market policies that reduce the rights of workers.27 After
almost one year of negotiations, the new Labour Code (Código de Trabalho, Law
nr. 99/2003 of 24 August 2003) was approved in parliament with the support of
the governing parties in April 2003 and, after presidential ratification, came into
force on 1 December 2003. This was the first time that such a codified docu-
ment had existed in Portugal since 1974. The purpose of the exercise was to make
the Portuguese economy more competitive. Several measures were introduced to
make the labour market more flexible, particularly in relation to legislation on
employee dismissal. It also included aspects of compulsory arbitration determined
by the Minister of Social Security and Labour in relation to the expiry of col-
lective agreements. There was also better regulation of night work and fixed-term
contracts. Moreover, employers were obliged to organise vocational training pro-
grammes for their employees, although the enforcement of such measures was not
sufficiently thought through. The code of practice was welcome by employers’
organisations, because it made the labour market more competitive. The opposition
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came from the main trade union confederations, CGTP-In and the General
Workers Union (UGT, União Geral dos Trabalhadores) and the leftwing opposition.
CGTP-In organised one-day strikes on 10 December 2002 and a joint one with
the UGT on 20 January 2003. The main argument of the trade union confed-
erations against the new Labour code was that it would increase the already high
level of precariousness of labour contracts based on low salaries28. In general terms,
the labour market reform did not contribute to a considerable improvement in
the employment situation. On the contrary, unemployment rose through 2004.
Although Portugal has a lower level of unemployment than the EU25, the pre-
carious nature of existing jobs can lead to fast growth of unemployment in times
of crisis. The most affected regions are naturally the southern regions of main-
land Portugal, in particular Alentejo, with higher unemployment figures passing
the 8 percent mark. The country’s lower unemployment figures are also sustained
by lack of reform of public administration. Furthermore, in 2004 46.7 percent of
the jobless were long-term unemployed, which is a sign of the deterioration of
the labour market since 2001, but particularly since 200329. The main reasons for
unemployment in 2003 and 2004 were collective dismissal due to closure of firms
and individual dismissal or the end of a temporary contract. The latter reached
24.1 percent in 2004 and 26.1 percent in 200330. In 2004 one fifth of persons
with higher education degrees, representing 9.5 percent of this specific job mar-
ket group, had difficulties finding a job. More problematic were young unem-
ployed people with basic education who represent 34.2 percent of this specific job
market group and of whom 17.6 percent were unemployed31.
The government tried also to gain the backing of the social partners for a
strategic social agreement. The social contract for competitiveness and employment
was geared towards fulfilling the growth and stability pact with the support of the
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Tabl. III. – U  P -
Overall Female Unemployment Youth Unemployment
18-24
2001 2002 2003 2004 2003 2004 2003 2004
Portugal 4.2 5.8 6.3 6.7 7.2 7.6 14.5 15.3
EU* 7.8 7.2 9.2 9.2 10.1 10.1 18.6 18.5
* EU 15 (2001-2002); EU 25 (2003-2004).
Source: Eurostat.
social partners. Negotiations took place during 2003 and 2004. The CGTP-In was
very keen to get more concessions from the government, so the negotiations took
longer than anticipated.
Taking Sides in the Iraq War
Portugal is traditionally a strong ally of the United States and as such aligned
with the Atlanticist countries of the European Union. It was one of the founding
members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nato)32. Nevertheless, European
integration led to growing Europeanisation of Portuguese foreign policy.33 Like in
other members of the European Union, the Iraq war contributed to divisions
among the political elite and the population34. Prime Minister Durão Barroso sup-
ported by Vice Prime Minister Paulo Portas strongly supported the American posi-
tion. The organisation of the Azores meeting in March 2004 was an initiative of
Prime Minister Durão Barroso. Although the US, UK and Spain were the main
visible actors in the coalition of the willing, the Portuguese government remained
a staunch supporter. This support was not shared by the leftwing opposition. All
three parties PSD, PCP and BE, vehemently opposed the war and took a simi-
lar position to that of the Franco-German alliance. This opposition to the war
was even supported by the Church, which normally does not intervene in public
debate. The anti-war opposition was strengthened by the support of the Christian-
democratic eminence grise, and former president of the United Nations Assembly,
Diogo Freitas do Amaral. He clearly saw this support of the Portuguese govern-
ment as quite negative for the country within the European Union35.
The Reshuffles of the Barroso Government
In the year 2003, the Barroso government had to make several reshuffles of the
cabinet. In early April 2003, he had to replace two ministers. Isaltino Morais, the
Minister for Cities, Planning of the Territory and Environment had to resign
because the media found out that he had evaded paying taxes and had several
Swiss bank accounts. He was replaced by the experienced civil servant Amilcar
Theias. The second minister was heavyweight Luis Francisco Valente de Oliveira
who had wanted to leave cabinet for a considerable period of time, and was wait-
ing for the earliest possible reshuffle to do this. He was replaced by António
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Carmona Rodrigues, a local civil servant working under the Mayor of Lisbon,
Pedro Santana Lopes.
The second major reshuffle took place in October 2003. Foreign Minister
António Martins da Cruz was forced to resign after allegations that his daughter
was granted entry to public university without having the required marks. By law,
children of diplomats are allowed to enter university without the necessary marks,
but Martins da Cruz had resigned from diplomatic service when he became a
minister, so the law no longer applied. Moreover, one of his relatives tried to get
a change of the law to accommodate his daughter’s wish. The press regarded this
as a clear case of influence peddling. He was replaced by Teresa Gouveia. Martins
da Cruz was a major loss for the Prime Minister, because both families were quite
close. The “Martins da Cruz” affair led involuntarily to the resignation of Minister
of Science and Higher Education Pedro Lynce. He was replaced by Graça Carvalho,
a civil servant from the ministry in question36.
In all, these reshuffles after one year in government clearly undermined the
credibility of the government. The loss of heavyweights and their replacement by
civil servants gave less visibility to many policy areas of the government.
The European Parliament Elections of 13 June 2004
The first half of 2004 was geared towards preparation of the campaign for the
European Parliament elections37. The Nice Treaty had reduced the number of
available seats from 25 to 24. There were nineteen parties competing in elec-
tions. Growing unease with the drastic austerity measures of the government was
a major issue of the campaign which started one month before the election. The
parties of the coalition government decided to stand as a united list. It was called
Força Portugal (Go On Portugal) and was strongly influenced by the electoral cam-
paigns of Italian tycoon Silvio Berlusconi and his party Forza Italia (Go On Italy).
The use of the strategy naturally meant a “footballisation” of the campaign. The
coalition parties used the forthcoming European championships to present an
image of optimism, which they hoped would boost their chances in the elections.
The head of the list was the former European Commissioner João de Deus Pinheiro
campaigning with posters under the banner of competence (competencia). The main
opposition party PS nominated António Sousa Franco as the head of its list. He
had served as Minister of Finances in the previous Guterres government and for-
mer Audit Court President. From the very beginning, opinion polls were strongly
in favour of António Sousa Franco who criticized the austerity policies of the gov-
52  
36 J.M. M, “Portugal”, European Journal for Political Research, XLIII (7-8), December 2004:
1116-1120, particularly pp. 1117-1118.
37 For a more detailed study see J.M. M, “Portugal”, in J. Lodge (ed.), The European
Parliaments Elections 2004, Basingstroke, Palgrave, 2005: 211-217 ; for a background of party sys-
tem dynamics European Parliament elections in Portugal, see M. Costa L, “Legitimizing the
EU Elections to the European Parliament in Portugal, 1987-1999”, in A. Costa Pinto (ed.),
Contemporary Portugal. Politics, Society and Culture, Boulder (Co), Columbia University Press, 2003:
203-226.
ernment and presented himself as the representative of a party which had and
has been involved in shaping the European Union from its very first beginnings.
Tragically, Sousa Franco died exhausted during campaigning in Matosinhos in
north Portugal on 8 June, some days before the elections.
The smaller parties also presented lists to the elections. The head of list for the
Communist Party and the Greens coalition was the experienced Member of the
European Parliament (MEP), Ilda Figueiredo. The party focused its campaign on
opposition to the Iraq War and the call for a referendum on the Constitutional
Treaty. The BE focused on the same topics as the Communist-Green coalition.
The negative impact of the economic policies of the government remained the
main topic of these leftwing parties. The head of list of B.E. was actually the
brother of Vice Prime Minister Paulo Portas, Miguel Portas.
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Party/coalition
2004 2004-1999
Percentage Seats Percentage Seats
Socialist Party (Ps) 44.5 12 +1.45 -
Força Portugal (PSD/CDS/PP) 33.3 9 -5.9 -2
Social Democratic Party (PSD) 9
Democratic Social Centre/People’s 
Party (CDS/PP) 2
Democratic Unitary Coalition (PCP-PEV) 9.1 2 -1.22 -
Block of the Left (BE) 4.9 1 +3.2 +1
Source: Commissão Nacional de Eleições, <http://www.cne.pt>, accessed on 28th Sept. 2005.
The electoral results confirmed the unpopularity of the right-centre coalition gov-
ernment. They were the big losers of the elections, losing 5.9 percent of the vote
in comparison to 1999. This led to a loss of two seats. Although the Communist-
Green coalition lost over one percent, it kept its two seats. The big winners were
the Socialist Party with an increase of +1.45 percent in relation to 1999 and
remaining with the same number of seats, and the BE which almost tripled its
vote and got one seat. In spite of all attempts by the European Parliament and
the National Electoral Commission to mobilise the population, abstention remained
quite high and even increased in relation to 1999. While in 1999, 60 percent did
not vote, in 2004 the figure increased to 61.3 percent.
The electoral results were a major blow to the right-centre coalition govern-
ment which was severely punished for its austerity policies. In spite of this fact,
the sudden emergence of the name of Prime Minister Durão Barroso as a poten-
tial compromise candidate as President of the European Commission changed the
topic of discussion. Moreover, the successful performance of the Portuguese national
football team throughout the European championships diverted attention from
national politics. During June and early July rumours indicated that Prime Minister
Durão Barroso wanted to reshuffle his cabinet. In the end, the nomination of
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Barroso for the presidency of the European Commission by the Council of Ministers
of the European Union, changed the situation.38
The Handover of the Prime Ministership: from José Manuel Barroso
to Pedro Santana Lopes
Prime Minister Barroso wanted to preserve the coalition government under a new
Prime Minister from his party. His proposed candidate was Pedro Santana Lopes,
his long-standing friend since his days as a student in the Faculty of Law at the
University of Lisbon, who was currently the Mayor of Lisbon. Barroso’s main
argument was that Portugal needed government stability to implement the aus-
terity measures and continue the economic convergence course in the European
Union. Socialist opposition leader Eduardo Ferro Rodrigues mobilised his party
and activists against such an option and urged President Jorge Sampaio to call
early elections, as he had done after the local elections of 2001. He was very
hopeful that Sampaio would decide on early elections. In fact, President Jorge
Sampaio accepted Barroso’s wish for continuity of the coalition government under
a new Prime Minister. This led to the resignation of Eduardo Ferro Rodrigues,
who felt that his credibility was undermined by this decision of the president39. 
The new government was sworn in on 23 July 2004. It led to major changes
in the composition of the government. Indeed, inside the PSD there were many
opponents to Santana Lopes, so many members of the Barroso government decided
against taking part in a Santana Lopes government. In total, only four members
of the previous Barroso government remained in the Santana Lopes government.
According to O Publico, there was an increase of ministers from 17 to 19 ministers
and from 36 to 38 Secretaries of State ( junior ministers) from the Barroso to the
Santana Lopes government. The CDS-PP lost two junior ministers in relation to
the Barroso government40.
The new Santana Lopes government had difficulties imposing its authority.
After the summer recess, the unpopularity of the government continued to be
quite high in the opinion polls. The continuation of the austerity measures under
a new team was lacking consistency and coherence. Many decisions of Santana
Lopes were regarded as hasty and clumsy. The image of the government deteri-
orated substantially during the months of October and November. This became
evident in the elections for the regional assemblies in the Azores and Madeira.
The two coalition parties lost ground in both autonomous regions.
In the Azores, regional President Carlos César was able to make substantial
gains in his socialist-dominated autonomous region, while the coalition parties,
which formed an electoral coalition, lost heavily. In Madeira, both coalition par-
ties ran for elections separately which led also to losses, but less than in Azores.
The charismatic president of the regional government Alberto João Jardim con-
tinues to be an asset for the PSD in this Atlantic island. In spite of that, the
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Socialist Party was able to make inroads and improve its share of the vote by 6.1
percent. This was a substantial gain for the opposition. Although the results have
to be understood primarily as a reaction to regional politics, they also had some
linkage with, and repercussion on national politics. The coalition parties lost heav-
ily in autonomous regions, which were natural strongholds of the centre-right. A
complete electoral disaster was only prevented by Jardim in Madeira.
The climax of the negative perception of the government came about when
Minister for Parliamentary Affairs, Rui Gomes da Silva, intervened on behalf of
the government against the weekly commentaries of party member Marcelo Rebelo
de Sousa on the independent television channel TVI. He accused Marcelo Rebelo
de Sousa of spreading ‘hate’ against the government and appealed to the regula-
tor, the High Authority for Social Communication (AASC, Alta Autoridade para a
Comunicação Social ), to intervene in this matter. The TVI channel decided to refrain
from airing his weekly commentaries. This was regarded as improper pressure of
the government exerted on TVI and as censorship against the critics of the gov-
ernment.41 Growing discontent with the performance of the government was met
by Prime Minister Santana Lopes with a reshuffle which went badly wrong.
Although Rui Gomes da Silva resigned from the Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs,
he now became minister of the presidency of the council of ministers. The reshuffle
led to no personnel changes, but some ministers switched portflios. Three days
later the government was sworn in and Henrique Chaves, the Minister for 
Sport, decided to resign due to the fact that he felt misled by the Prime Minister,
because no additional funding for his ministry would be available. The resigna-
tion of Chaves was quite embarrassing for the government. Moreover, resistance
against his government continued to grow inside his own party. Quite relevant
was the intervention of éminence grise Anibal Cavaco Silva in the weekly news-
paper Expresso at the end of November. He was quoted as saying, without 
naming Prime Minister Santana Lopes, that incompetent people should be replaced
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Parties Azores Madeira
2004 2000-2004 2004 2000-2004
% seats % seats % seats % seats
PPD/PSD 53.7 44 -2.2 +3
PPD/PSD-CDS 36.8 21 -5.6 +1
PS 57.0 31 +7.8 +1 27.5 19 +6.1 +6
CDS-PP 7.03 2 -2.7 -1
PCP-GREENS 2.80 - -2 -2 5.50 2 +0.9 -
BE 0.97 -0.4 - 3.70 1 +3.7 1
Source: Commissão Nacional de Eleições, <http://www.cne.pt>, accessed on 28th Sept. 2005.
41 Visão, 25 Nov. 2004, http://www.visaoonline.clix.ptaccessed on 25th November 2004.
by competent ones. Moreover, the request of Prime Minister Santana Lopes to
undertake another reshuffle due to the resignation of Chaves was not granted by
President Jorge Sampaio. Instead, Jorge Sampaio called for early elections and
asked the outgoing government to approve the budget on 2 December, before
formally resigning. 
This was the end of the centre-right coalition government which was clearly
conditioned by the need to implement highly unpopular austerity measures to
restore macro-economic convergence towards the European Union42. Apart from
the very difficult agenda that the right centre coalition had to undertake, one has
to acknowledge that after the power handover from Barroso to Lopes the over-
all discipline of the government in the implementation of the austerity measures
began to slip away. This has to do with the fact, that Prime Minister Lopes had
almost no time to prepare himself for the new job. Moreover, he had to select a
more or less new team in order to continue the work of the previous govern-
ment. Last, but not least, the highly divisive personality of Prime Minister Santana
Lopes both inside as well as outside the party may have contributed to the down-
fall of his government. The image of a disorganised government reflected on his
ability or rather inability to present a cohesive whole.
The Elections of 20 February 2005: the Historical Victory of the
Socialist Party
After the resignation of Eduardo Ferro Rodrigues as leader of the Socialist Party,
José Socrates, a former minister of the Guterres government, became interim party
chief. Finally, in November 2004, he was confirmed as the new party leader with
an overwhelming majority of the delegates at a party conference. Socialist Party
leader Ferro Rodrigues was highly popular with the population, but the pae-
dophilia scandal of Casa Pia in 2003 had damaged his authority within the party
considerably. The main reason was that Ferro Rodrigues stood by his friend Paulo
Pedroso, a former minister in the Guterres government, who was placed in pre-
ventive custody due to his alleged involvement in the scandal. Although Paulo
Pedroso was not charged and was released in October 2003, João Soares and his
supporters launched a negative campaign against him within the party. This was
reinforced by a witch hunt in the Portuguese press against Paulo Pedroso. After
Paulo Pedroso’s release in the autumn, Ferro Rodrigues was again able to gain
widespread popularity. Nevertheless, Jorge Sampaio’s decision to support govern-
mental stability by nominating Pedro Santana Lopes to replace Durão Barroso in
July 2004, led to his resignation. 
Throughout the autumn 2004 opinion polls indicated that new socialist leader
José Socrates was the best-liked politician. In terms of elections, opinion polls gave
him a decisive lead, with a possible absolute majority for the Socialist Party. 
The popularity of José Socrates contrasted heavily with the unpopularity of the
outgoing government. The Socialist Party could also count on the support of
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heavyweight outgoing European Commissioner António Vitorino, who became its
electoral campaign strategist. Like during the electoral campaigns of António
Guterres, the Socialist Party set up a forum with an internet website called “New
Frontiers” (Novas Fronteiras) which was designed to mobilise the electorate around
its project. The programme of the PS followed the model of the previous social-
ist government under Prime Minister António Guterres, tending to emulate the
British style party manifesto for the forthcoming legislature. The programme was
called Government Manifesto for Portugal. 2005-2009. To Believe Again and naturally
emphasised continuity in relation to the policies of the previous governments.
Nevertheless, it emphasised the aspect of social and economic cohesion and a
process of economic convergence towards the European Union which should be
achieved in a mid-term perspective, but also be accompanied by social measures
in order to reduce the burden upon The poorest segments of the population.
Moreover, the so-called growth strategy was very keen to improve the qualification
structure of the Portuguese and reduce the income gap between richest and the
poorest, the largest in the European Union43.




% Seats % Seats
PS 45.00 121 +7.20 +25
PSD 28.70 75.00 -11.50 -30
PCP-PEV 7.50 14.00 +0.60 +2.0
CDS-PP 7.24 12.00 -1.56 -2.0
BE 6.40 8.00 +3.60 +5.0
Source: Commissão Nacional de Eleições, <http://www.cne.pt>, accessed on 28th Sept. 2005.
On election day, the centre-right parties lost heavily. While the CDS-PP under
Paulo Portas was able to contain the losses by losing only 1.56 percentage points
and 2 seats, the big loser was the PSD led by Santana Lopes. His party lost 11.5
percent and 30 seats, remaining below the 30 percent threshold. The big winner
was the Socialist Party with a landslide victory giving it a comfortable absolute
majority of 6 seats. The other parties of the left were also to profit from the
downfall of the centre-right coalition. The Communist Party-Green coalition was
able to improve its share of the vote in comparison to 2002. New Communist
leader Jerónimo de Sousa was able to appeal better to the masses than his pre-
decessor Carlos Carvalhas. Last but not least, the Block of the Left became a
strong party challenging the Communist Party. It almost tripled its share of the
vote and seats. It shows that there is space for a new leftwing party in the
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Portuguese political system, and the BE under the leadership of Francisco Louçã
was able to capitalise on it. Now the BE was represented at local, regional, national
and European levels, becoming a fully-fledged national party.
In all, the coalition government led to substantial electoral costs for the PSD,
less so for the CDS-PP. This shows that, in Portugal, the senior partner tends to
be punished harsher by the electorate than the junior partner. This happened in
1985, when the senior partner, the Socialist Party, was punished heavily by the
electorate, while the PSD with its new charismatic leader, Anibal Cavaco Silva,
was able to win the elections and stay in power for a decade44.
* * *
The centre-right coalition government was formed, because the PSD under Barroso
was not able to achieve an absolute majority. Its main purpose was to tackle the
budget deficit and reduce public spending. Most of the government’s instability
could be found in the senior partner, the PSD, less so in the junior CDS-PP. The
opposition to Barroso from factions within the party, and later on to Santana
Lopes, undermined the credibility of the government. The government was able
to push through many important reforms, such as the Labour Code, but the lack
of consultation meant that such changes would always be reversible when a new
government came to power.
The short-term austerity policies were ill-designed to achieve sustainable con-
vergence. In spite of three years of cuts in public administration and the selling
public companies, the budget deficit remained only slightly below the threshold. 
Last but not least, the changeover from Barroso to Santana Lopes in the sum-
mer 2004 broke the rhythm of reform and implementation of austerity measures.
A new Prime Minister and new team could not ensure the continuity and sur-
vival of an unpopular government. In this sense, Prime Minister Santana Lopes
had almost no room for manœuvre. Moreover, in-fighting in the PSD itself under-
mined the credibility of the government.
The end result was heavy losses at the European Parliament elections, regional
elections in the Azores and, finally, in the legislative elections of 18 February 2005.
The absolute majority of the Socialist Party will contribute to political and macro-
economic stability in order to undertake the necessary public administration reform,
long term investment in human resources and research and development. In this
effort, the Socialist government will need to tackle the continuing inequalities in
Portuguese society, otherwise the gap between Portuguese political elites and the
population will continue to grow.
A report from the Bank of Portugal commissioned by the new socialist gov-
ernment found that the budget deficit of 2004-2005, taking into account the EU
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statistical methodology, was predicted to reach between 6.5 and 6.8 percent, if
extra revenues were not included. It means that the present Socialist government
is under considerable pressure to keep on the path of convergence45.
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